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FUNDAMENTALS OF ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES AND 
WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT
PETER W. SCHUHMANN AND KURT A. SCHWABE
Abstract: This paper presents an overview of the economic fundamentals involved in wildlife management, with special 
consideration for cases involving harmful wildlife-human interactions. The process of benefit-cost analysis is used as a unifying 
platform for incorporating both theoretical and empirical issues. Topics such as external market effects and public goods are 
detailed in order to give the reader a theoretical foundation for understanding the economic perspective on the problems associ-
ated with defining and attaining optimally managed wildlife populations. To these principles we add practical considerations for 
measuring the costs and benefits associated with wildlife populations. Different categories of wildlife values, such as use and 
nonuse values, and alternative methodologies for their measurement are described. The paper concludes with a discussion of 
areas for improving data collection and value estimation so that the goals and perspectives of economists and wildlife managers 
can be further integrated.
Key words: benefit cost analysis, economic value, wildlife management. 
The purpose of this paper is to discuss, in general 
terms, an economic approach to addressing the prob-
lems associated with human-wildlife conflicts. We say 
general in that many of the remaining articles explore 
the specifics of the problems and factors that we intro-
duce. It should be noted that, from an economic per-
spective, human-wildlife conflicts are just 1 part of a 
larger problem, wildlife management. Thus, we will 
broaden our focus to include the optimal management 
of wildlife, of which human-wildlife conflicts are an 
integral part. Indeed, a somewhat naïve and trivial solu-
tion to minimizing the conflicts surrounding human-
wildlife interaction would be to reduce the amount of 
wildlife. Yet, in addition to the valuable roles wildlife 
plays in protecting and enhancing ecosystems, people 
value wildlife for both consumptive and nonconsump-
tive uses. While some of these values are captured in 
markets, others are not.
An example of consumptive and nonconsumptive 
values from wildlife is found in Loomis et al. (1989a). 
They estimate the value of California deer for hunting 
purposes to be approximately US$230 million and for 
viewing purposes roughly US$34.5 million. Moreover, 
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service suggests that more 
than 76 million Americans engage in “nonconsumptive 
practices” such as viewing or photographing wildlife 
(Ohio Division of Wildlife (ODNR 1998)). Hence, any 
discussion of resolving the problems associated with 
human-wildlife conflict must include the potential 
trade-offs associated with the proposed solutions that 
are likely to impact the value these resources generate. 
Furthermore, such a discussion must acknowledge that 
the interaction between human and market systems 
and the natural environment flows in both directions 
(Fig. 1).
 One method that helps inform us of the relative 
trade-offs of alternative wildlife management strategies 
is Benefit-Cost Analysis. Benefit-Costs Analysis (BCA) 
provides for a systematic enumeration of the gains 
(benefits) and losses (costs) of particular decisions, in 
common units, for comparison purposes. Reed et al. 
(1982) provide 1 of the few BCAs of human-wildlife 
conflict in their research on reducing deer-vehicle colli-
sions (DVCs). In their analysis, the benefits of reducing 
DVCs are associated with lower deer mortality and vehi-
cle damage, while the costs of reducing these events 
include fence installation and maintenance. Conceptu-
ally, Reed et al. account for 2 of the 3 economic aspects 
that Keith and Lyon (1985) outline as necessary require-
ments of public wildlife management decisions, includ-
ing: (1) “…value to users of increases or decreases in 
wildlife populations,” and (2) “the costs of providing 
Fig. 1. Interaction between markets and the natural 
environment. Adapted from Kahn (1998) and Baumol 
and Blinder (1997). 
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increments of wildlife populations through habitat 
manipulations and/or other management alternatives.” 
Keith and Lyon also suggest such analyses account for 
the relationships between current and future wildlife 
populations.
The importance of accounting for both the tem-
poral and spatial dimensions associated with wildlife 
populations and management decisions are critical. As 
Tietenberg (1997) notes, wildlife populations, like other 
resource stocks, are viewed by economists as composite 
assets that provide benefits to humans over time, and as 
with other assets, we wish to optimize their value. From 
an economic perspective, then, the primary goal of 
wildlife management is to find the population size that 
maximizes the net benefits from the resource, where 
net benefits are defined as the difference between total 
costs and total benefits to all affected parties of using 
the resource.1 Once the optimal population size has 
been determined, a secondary goal is to evaluate alter-
native measures for achieving this size. Together, these 
actions synthesize 2 general strands of research in the 
economics of wildlife management: works that focus 
on estimating the value of additional wildlife resources 
(e.g., Hammack and Brown 1974, Keith and Lyon 1985, 
Loomis et al. 1989a, Bockstael and McConnell 1999) 
and works that estimate costs that wildlife impose on 
society (e.g., Reed et al. 1982, Conover 1994, Romin and 
Bissonette 1996a).
The next section will highlight the economic con-
sequences associated with human-wildlife conflict by 
presenting some general cost and damages estimates. 
This section will also include a discussion of some 
of the difficulties associated with managing wildlife 
resources, including problems associated with externali-
ties, open-access, and public goods. The third section 
will discuss the conceptual aspects of using net benefits 
as the criterion to judge the economic desirability of 
alternative management schemes. How we define ben-
efits, what counts as a cost, and the importance of 
including the time element are all addressed. The fourth 
section presents some empirical issues and estimates 
for valuing and costing wildlife resources. In particular, 
several environmental resource valuation techniques 
designed to capture the nonmarket value of wildlife 
resources are discussed. The last section concludes 
with a discussion of potential policies for achieving 
the desired objectives and calls for coordinated efforts 
between researchers within different disciplines and 
both local and state wildlife agencies. 
Before discussing the costs and damages associ-
ated with human-wildlife conflicts, it is important to 
acknowledge a few assumptions we, as economists, 
make. First, “value” is defined in an anthropocentric 
context. That is, a resource has value only to the extent 
that people care about it. This is in contrast to defining 
value in a biocentric context, which basically gives 
all creatures in the ecosystem equal standing (Loomis 
1993). Second, the value of a resource, even in econom-
ics terms, can include both market and nonmarket activ-
ities, as well as both use and nonuse values.2 Finally, 
while the term “human-wildlife conflict” includes both 
the impact of wildlife on humans and the impact of 
humans on wildlife, our primary focus is on the impact 
of wildlife on humans. It should be noted, though, that 
this approach does not exclude the value that people 
place on damages to wildlife. Indeed, such aesthetic or 
moral values do fit within the anthropocentric realm.
COSTS, DAMAGES, AND MARKET FAILURE IN 
THE MANAGEMENT OF WILDLIFE
Only a cursory familiarization with the literature 
on human-wildlife interaction is needed to appreciate 
what these interactions cost society (e.g., Conover 1994, 
Conover et al. 1995, Cook and Daggett 1995, Romin 
and Bissonette 1996). One of the most complete evalua-
tions of the costs wildlife impose on the United States 
was by Conover et al. (1995). In their summary of wild-
life-human conflicts nationwide (including human ill-
ness and fatalities from wildlife-related diseases, bites or 
attacks; animal-vehicle collisions; and wildlife damage 
to agricultural production, households, and timber pro-
duction) the authors estimated that roughly 415 deaths 
and 75,000 injuries or illnesses occurred each year from 
wildlife-related disease, attacks, and collisions. Overall, 
Conover et al. suggested that the total economic loss 
from wildlife-related damages was approximately US$3 
billion annually.3 To put this figure in perspective, the 
annual budget of the federal government for conserva-
tion and land management programs is less than US$5 
billion (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1996).
One of the largest components of these damages 
is deer-vehicle collisions. The National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration suggested that 120 human deaths 
occurred from DVCs in 1990 and estimated that the 
national cost in motorist loss of life and injury is 
nearly US$200 million annually. In terms of lost wildlife, 
Romin and Bissonette (1996) estimated that more than 
500,000 deer are killed each year in DVCs. Cook and 
Daggett (1995) estimated that vehicle collisions account 
for 500 moose deaths in Alaska every year, and over a 
5-year period more than 200 black bear deaths occurred 
from animal-vehicle collisions in Florida and Pennsylva-
1 We note that the parties that realize the benefits from a given wildlife popula-
tion or wildlife policy may be different than those individuals that bear its 
costs. Further, both benefits and costs may be distributed temporally and 
spatially. 
2 “Use” values include those values associated with the tangible uses of the 
resources while “nonuse” values account for the intangible uses, such as leav-
ing the resource for future generations. Further discussion of these concepts 
is provided in a later section.
3 From a regulatory perspective, the United States Department of Agriculture 
Wildlife Services Program spent more than US$26 million in 1988 on efforts 
to reduce the damages from wildlife and spent an additional US$11 million 
on administration-related expenditures (Rollins and Briggs 1996).
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nia. Endangered species are also lost in animal-vehicle 
collisions. For example, since 1979 more than 54% of 
the endangered Florida panther population and 65 of 
the 300 endangered Florida Key deer have been killed 
via collisions with vehicles (Cook and Daggett 1995). 
Finally, more than 20 million small animals (e.g., rabbits, 
badgers, reptiles, dogs, cat, and birds) are killed each 
year due to collisions with vehicles, including aircraft 
(Cook and Daggett 1995). 
In addition to the costs associated with collisions 
with vehicles, wildlife-related crop damages are a sub-
stantial component of the overall costs of human-wild-
life conflict. Estimates of annual wildlife-related crop 
damage in the U.S. range from US$464 million in 1994 
(Conover et. al. 1995) to US$533 million in 1989 (Wywi-
alowski 1994). At the state-level, Forster and Hitzhusen 
(1997) estimated that Ohio farmers lost approximately 
US$46 million from wildlife-related crop damage. 
While these costs and damages may seem exces-
sive and beg for immediate management intervention, 
optimal management strategies must consider both the 
costs and benefits of wildlife resources. Indeed, many 
states explicitly express their objectives of managing 
wildlife populations with consideration of both the 
benefits and costs. For example, in Ohio the goal 
for deer management includes maximizing the recre-
ational opportunities such as hunting, viewing, and 
photographing within the context of minimizing con-
flicts with agriculture, motor travel, and other areas 
of human endeavor (Ohio Department of Natural 
Resources 1998). Similarly, in Wisconsin the deer man-
agement policy states that, “…regulations shall be 
designed to maintain a herd in balance with its range 
and at population levels reasonably compatible with 
agricultural and forest management objectives…”(Creed 
et al. 1984). These principles capture the idea of opti-
mal management strategy, yet in practice 3 potential 
problems arise that can inhibit local or state officials 
from managing these resources optimally. These include 
externalities, open access externalities, and public 
goods.
Externalities and Open-Access 
Many states manage wildlife resources in terms 
of geographical areas. For instance, in Wisconsin deer 
resources are managed in “management units,” with 
96 such units in the state and each unit averaging 
approximately 1,500 km2. Similarly, Ohio manages its 
wildlife populations at the county level. One problem 
with this management scheme is that wildlife resources 
are not physically confined to either management units 
or county boundaries. As such, actions officials take at 
the management unit level are likely to impose costs 
(or benefits) on the adjacent areas. In essence, the man-
agement authorities in 1 unit will base their optimal 
population targets on the benefits and costs that they 
incur but will not account for or “internalize” any resid-
ual effects these actions impose on surrounding areas. 
These residual effects often translate into costs and ben-
efits imposed on others. When decisions by 1 county 
or management unit are made without consideration 
of the external costs or benefits these decisions may 
impose on others, each county or management unit may 
achieve their economically efficient population levels, 
but the state as a whole may be operating at an inef-
ficient level. This suggests that some intervention at the 
state level should coordinate population targets across 
inter-county or management units. Clearly, the distribu-
tional effects of policy on overall efficiency should play 
a role in policy design. 
Another problem with managing wildlife 
resources is that many of these resources reside on 
private lands. As such, decisions by the private land-
owner with respect to maintaining suitable habitats for 
these resources may not be optimal for society. In other 
words, the private landowner’s actions impose costs 
on society.4 For example, Rollins and Briggs (1996) dis-
cussed private decision-making by agricultural landown-
ers near Horicon Marsh in Wisconsin regarding whether 
to passively provide forage for Canada geese (Branta 
Canadensis) as the geese migrate across their land. 
These geese provide large recreational benefits to hunt-
ers (Bishop and Heberlein 1979), yet the costs accrue to 
agricultural producers via foregone production. Hence, 
private decisions by landowners around Horicon Marsh 
may not acknowledge the benefits these geese provide 
to Wisconsin hunters. From society’s perspective, the 
benefits of having the geese available for hunting may 
outweigh the costs the geese impose on agriculture. 
Hence, when the incidences of costs and benefits from 
a particular resource management decision differ, the 
solution attained through private decision-making is 
likely to be inefficient. We can conclude that the prob-
lems associated with both fugitive resources and exter-
nalities complicate the management process, and sug-
gest that efforts to achieve the socially optimal popula-
tion size require a higher level of government involve-
ment. 
As the term implies, a resource that is considered 
open-access, meaning it is open to uncontrolled access 
by potential users of the resource (Field 1997), often 
leads to users imposing external costs on other users 
and nonusers of the resource. A classic example 
includes a fishery where the anglers continue to fish 
without considering the impacts of their actions on 
others, i.e., less fish for other anglers. In effect, individu-
als engage in their own private-decision making process 
without regard to the external costs they impose on 
others. With an open-access resource, the costs are in 
4 Alternatively, decisions by the federal, state, or local governments with 
respect to resource usage could impose costs on private landowners. For a 
detailed discussion how of public agencies impose costs on private landown-
ers with respect to wildlife management, see Lueck (1995).
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the form of a reduction in resources, resource usage, or 
resource quality for others. Finally, since the resource 
is open-access, 1 user cannot restrict another user 
from the resource. From an economic perspective, the 
market alone will not utilize the resource efficiently and 
thus some level of government intervention is required.
Public Goods
Another difficulty with managing resources at the 
local level is that many of these resources have public 
good characteristics. A public good is a good that is 
both nonrivial and nonexcludable. That is, 1 person’s 
consumption does not diminish the amount left over 
for others to consumer (nonrivial) nor does 1 person’s 
consumption inhibit others from consuming the good 
(nonexcludable). Thus, once a public good such as wild-
life services are provided to 1 unit or locality, another 
unit can consume them without cost. 
While at first glance public goods may not seem 
like a problem, consider the case of endangered species 
that reside in such a unit or county. The benefits the 
species provide to society may extend far beyond the 
borders of the unit or county. Indeed, such benefits can 
conceivably extend over political and national boundar-
ies and across generations. Yet, the costs of maintaining 
these resources are likely to fall upon the authority 
under which the resource resides. While it is likely that 
the value to society is much greater than the costs of 
maintaining the resource, appropriating the required 
funds for maintaining the resource from members of 
society that value it may be difficult. This difficulty 
arises because once the resource is provided to 1, every-
one can “use” it regardless of his or her part in helping 
to provide the resource. This phenomenon, known as 
“free-riding”, takes place because of the assumption 
that other members will provide the resource. If 
enough members engage in this “free-riding,” the funds 
required to provide the resource may be inadequate and 
thus the resource may be under-provided. While this 
problem does provide a role for additional government 
involvement, such as public financing for the good, gov-
ernment action may not resolve the problem fully. As 
Loomis (1993) pointed out, the provision of additional 
public goods still involves opportunity costs, costs that 
may consist of tax monies that would otherwise provide 
alternative services that people value. As such, these 
are additional trade-offs whose costs and benefits need 
to be evaluated to determine the overall impact on net 
benefits.
CONCEPTUAL ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH NET 
BENEFITS: BENEFITS, COSTS, AND TIME
The attractiveness of BCA is that it can inform 
policy makers of the benefits and costs of alternative 
resource uses to society and provide a criterion – net 
benefits – by which to judge alternatives. We begin this 
section with a definition of benefits and costs, and then 
discuss some issues involved with combining these 2 
factors into an estimate of net benefits. We conclude 
with a discussion of the dynamic nature of wildlife 
resources and the importance of acknowledging the 
distribution of costs and benefits across time.
Benefits
 Economists use the term “benefits” to mean the 
dollar value of the satisfaction obtained from the use of 
a good or service. It is important to identify 2 character-
istics of the term “value” in economics. As noted in Field 
(1997) and mentioned above, value is defined from an 
anthropocentric context and is only meaningful relative 
to what people are willing and able to give up for the 
good or service. If people are not willing to pay or trade 
something to obtain a particular good, we say that good 
has zero value. Alternatively, if someone was willing and 
able to give up some amount of 1 good for another 
good, say a pair of tennis shoes for a hunting license, we 
would say that this person values the hunting license at 
least as much as a pair of tennis shoes.
While there may be many combinations of goods 
people would be willing and able to give up for any 
other particular good, what is useful and convenient 
for comparison and aggregation purposes is to define 
the value of a particular good to an individual as the 
most this individual would be willing and able to give 
up to obtain the good (Fig. 2). Furthermore, and again 
for comparison and aggregation purposes, it would be 
convenient to measure the trade-offs with a common 
metric. Economists have therefore defined the value of 
a good to any particular individual as the most this 
individual would be willing and able to pay for the 
good (Fig. 2). Going back to benefits, then, we see that 
the benefits one derives from a good or service can 
be measured by the (greatest) amount of income an 
individual would be willing (and able) to give up in 
order to consume the good. While income is used as a 
measure of the amount by which an individual is made 
Fig. 2. The components of value.
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better off from using the resource, it should be noted 
that there is nothing inherently attractive about income. 
Rather, income serves as a proxy for the other bundles 
of goods or services this income could have otherwise 
purchased. 
These concepts may seem relatively straightfor-
ward, yet there are some common misunderstandings 
and misconceptions with how economists use the term 
value, and ultimately then, benefits. First, value is not 
measured by what you actually have to pay for a good, 
but rather by what you would be willing to pay for a 
good. Along these same lines, cost is not an accurate 
representation of value. One can easily imagine a ser-
vice that costs an enormous amount, say importing sand 
from the Middle East to Colorado, yet is valued quite 
low.
As far as misconceptions, economic value is often 
thought of as only pertaining to those goods that are 
traded in the market place, i.e., market goods have value 
as observed by people willing to buy and sell them. 
Yet, goods that are not traded in the market (nonmarket 
goods such as clean air, clean water, or the sunset at 
the Grand Canyon) have economic value as well. In 
these latter cases, rather than obtaining these goods via 
trades in the market place, people are willing to give 
up time or other resources (including money) for the 
opportunity to consume them. 
Finally, the economic value of a nonmarket good 
entails both use and nonuse values. The more com-
monly acknowledged “use” value consists of the tan-
gible components of the good, such as actually traveling 
to the Grand Canyon to see the sunsets, view the 
wildlife, or hike the trails. The less commonly known 
“nonuse” values pertain to the intangible or indirect 
uses of a good. Such intangible uses, which will be 
discussed in more detail in the next section, include 
saving the good for use at some other time (option 
value), saving the good for future generations (bequest 
value), saving the good for others to use now (altruistic 
value), and simply saving the good for the mere sake of 
its existence (existence value).
One of the guiding principles of economics is 
that the additional benefits or satisfaction derived from 
subsequent units of a given resource typically decrease, 
i.e., benefits are decreasing at the margin. For example, 
the benefit realized by a hunter for the first unit of 
game harvested will likely exceed the benefits from 
the second unit harvested, and so on.5 As the marginal 
benefit is the dollar value of the satisfaction derived 
from an additional unit of the resource, we can state 
that marginal benefit is a measure of the maximum 
willingness to pay for that unit. Hence we can assume 
that a hunter’s willingness to pay for additional units of 
the resource will be decreasing in the quantity of the 
resource consumed. This relationship is illustrated in 
Fig. 1 by the marginal benefit curve (MB).6 
The marginal benefit curve (MB) is synonymous 
with the demand curve used in economic principles, 
and provides several pieces of information regarding 
the preferences of individuals for a particular good or 
service.7 Starting with a particular quantity on the hori-
zontal axis, the MB curve reveals the marginal benefit 
or willingness-to-pay for that unit (Fig. 3). This value 
is the highest price the individual would pay for that 
additional unit. Starting with a dollar value on the verti-
cal axis, the MB curve also reveals the greatest quantity 
that will be purchased at that dollar value or price. The 
area under the MB curve at any quantity is the total will-
ingness to pay for that consumption level. This value, 
which is also referred to as the benefits, represents the 
amount a person would be willing to pay to attain that 
level of the good or service rather than go without it 
entirely (Field 1997). 
Costs
 The cost of achieving a particular objective can 
be thought of as what is given up – i.e., inputs – to 
obtain the objective. Typically, we use the term oppor-
tunity costs – a term that measures the dollar value 
of the inputs in their next best alternative. As noted in 
Boardman et al. (1996), opportunity costs measure the 
value of what society must forego to achieve any par-
ticular objective. The reason we use the term opportu-
5 It is important to recognize that this assumes that the quality of a unit is 
held constant. 
Fig. 3. Marginal costs and marginal benefits.
6 While we present the MB function as a straight line that need not be the case. 
It is often represented by a negatively sloped curve.
7 The MB curve for an individual reveals his or her preferences for the good 
or service and is a function of his or her willingness and ability to pay for 
that good. The summation of a number of individual demand curves (known 
as an aggregate demand curve) reveals the marginal benefit for a group of 
individuals.
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8 This principle follows from the scarcity of resources – the fewer units of a 
good that are available, the higher the marginal value of each unit. This cost 
is often referred to as the “user cost.”
nity costs is that by using the resources for 1 activity, we 
give up the opportunity of using these same resources 
in another activity. For example, in erecting fences 
along a highway to reduce the incidences of DVCs, the 
costs would include the capital and labor required to 
install and maintain the fencing. There may also be 
some administrative costs required to coordinate the 
installation and maintenance.
While benefits are modeled as decreasing at the 
margin, economists typically model costs as increasing 
at the margin. This relationship holds for both costs 
of production and costs in terms of foregone benefits 
from natural resources.8 Increasing costs of production 
follows from the law of diminishing marginal productiv-
ity (e.g., Hyman 1996:199-203) which states that given 
some fixed factors of production the additional oppor-
tunity costs of production increase as more of that 
particular product is produced. The increasing foregone 
benefits suggest that, as more of a resource is used 
up today, the value of remaining units of the resource 
will increase. For example, as more and more deer are 
depleted via hunting thus leaving fewer for the remain-
ing part of the season, the value of those remaining deer 
will likely increase (Fig. 1).
 In the context of market goods and services, the 
marginal cost curve (MC) represents the supply relation-
ship for the good. In this sense, this curve reveals the 
quantity of the good that firms would be willing and 
able to bring to market at various prices. This interpre-
tation is not as appropriate for environmental goods 
and services. However, we can represent the cost of 
providing different levels of environmental goods with 
an upward sloping function. Again, the marginal cost of 
a particular quantity unit is found using the correspond-
ing value on the vertical axis, and the area under the 
MC curve at that quantity represents the total cost of 
providing that quantity, barring any fixed costs.
Net Benefits 
The net benefits of a particular good or service 
are simply the difference between the value society 
places on that good or service, i.e., the most they would 
be willing to pay, less the resources they must forego 
to obtain it, i.e., the opportunity costs. For example, 
suppose a hunter values the opportunity to hunt deer 
during a particular season at US$100. That is, the most 
they would be willing to pay, i.e., the benefits, for hunt-
ing deer is US$100. Furthermore, let us suppose that in 
order to hunt deer, the hunter must purchase both a 
hunting license for US$20 and a deer permit for US$15, 
for a total cost of US$35. The net benefits of hunting 
deer to this particular hunter, then, is US$65.
Now the question arises as to what is lost if 
this hunter is not allowed to hunt deer. Obviously, the 
hunter will not garner the benefits of hunting the deer, 
which is measured at US$100. Yet, this is not what 
is lost, since the hunter would have had to forgo the 
US$35 to hunt the deer. That is, if he cannot hunt 
deer, he still has the US$35 to spend in some other 
manner. What are lost, then, are the net benefits that 
the hunter would have derived from engaging in the 
hunting experience, i.e., US$65. The loss to society of 
not allowing this hunter to hunt deer is the additional 
benefit above and beyond the costs required to hunt 
deer. This term, labeled above as net benefits, is com-
monly referred to as “consumer surplus,” and is used 
to gauge the gain or loss to society from a particular 
action.
Focusing on Fig. 3 the net benefits (benefits less 
costs) of a given quantity is the area below the MB 
curve and above the MC curve. Economic efficiency 
in provision of the good or service is defined as the 
quantity of the environmental service that maximizes 
the total net benefits realized by society. Achieving 
this optimal quantity requires that both the marginal 
benefit and marginal cost relationships be measured 
and examined together. Economic efficiency is achieved 
by balancing the costs of an additional unit with the 
benefits of an additional unit. Because of the shapes of 
these 2 functions, by producing and consuming up to 
the point where the marginal benefit of another unit is 
equal to the marginal cost (MB = MC), an efficient solu-
tion is achieved and net benefits are maximized. 
Q* shows the quantity that maximizes net ben-
efits. At Q* the MB and MC curves intersect – i.e., MB 
= MC. To understand why net benefits are maximized 
at this point, consider producing either 1 more or 1 less 
unit. If society produces 1 more unit (Q* +1), the mar-
ginal cost of that additional unit is greater than the mar-
ginal benefit of that additional unit. Therefore, produc-
tion and consumption of that unit causes net benefits 
to decrease. Alternatively, if production decreases by 1 
unit (Q* -1), the forgone benefits are greater than the 
costs saved. Again, this would lead to a reduction in 
the overall net benefits. Hence, movements away from 
Q*, whether to the left or the right, necessarily lead to 
fewer net benefits and are therefore deemed suboptimal 
or inefficient. 
Net Benefits, Populations, and Time
While it may seem straightforward to calculate 
the benefits, the costs, and then the net benefits of a 
particular action, 2 factors arise in managing wildlife 
resources that can add further complexity to the issue. 
First, since wildlife populations are essentially renew-
able resources, actions to control populations today will 
have implications on the future availability of the popu-
lation. Second, it is often the case that benefits and 
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costs of wildlife management activities are incurred in 
different time periods (or by different individuals in the 
same time period).
A consideration of the full costs and benefits of 
a wildlife population requires that the dynamic nature 
of the resource be recognized, modeled, and directly 
linked to economic valuation. Empirical examples of 
so-called “bioeconomic models” are fairly uncommon 
in the literature because they require a synthesis of 
knowledge and methods from multiple disciplines.9 To 
illustrate the importance of these different views on 
resource management, we present a well-known treat-
ment of the problem of renewable resource manage-
ment.
Assuming that a resource stock or population in 
question is characterized by a logistic growth pattern, 
growth of the population will be increasing in popula-
tion up to some size, after which population growth 
is positive but decreasing until the stock reaches some 
maximum possible size (the carrying capacity of the 
environment). A given level of harvest (measured in the 
same units as growth) is said to be a “sustainable yield” 
when it is equal to the growth rate of the population. 
That is, when the rate of removal is equal to the rate 
of natural growth, a situation develops where the rate 
of removal is sustainable indefinitely, at least from a 
theoretical perspective. The population size that allows 
for the highest rate of growth is termed the maximum 
sustainable yield (MSY). 
Managing a population at the maximum sustain-
able yield, though, may not be efficient from an eco-
nomic perspective. Merely examining yield (the number 
of units of the resource that are harvested per time 
period) only reveals the benefits derived from a given 
population size. For efficiency, both costs and benefits 
must be considered to achieve an efficient sustainable 
yield (ESY). The ESY is defined by the harvest rate 
that, when maintained perpetually, produces the largest 
amount of net benefits. The 2 types of costs that are 
generally considered in such dynamic models include 
the costs of harvest efforts and the costs imposed on 
individuals outside the market (i.e., the “external costs” 
such as DVCs and crop damage). Because the costs of 
harvest efforts are likely decreasing in the size of the 
resource population while the external costs are likely 
increasing in population size, the shape of the cost func-
tion for a given resource is an empirical question. We 
can state, however, that the efficient sustainable yield 
is unlikely to occur at the same population size as the 
maximum sustainable yield.
Another potential complication associated with 
estimating the net benefits of a particular action is that 
some costs and benefits may be realized immediately 
while others may be realized in the future.10 Indeed, 
most wildlife policy changes are likely to lead to costs 
and benefits that may be distributed over a lengthy 
time horizon. Furthermore, they may be distributed 
unevenly. For example, the costs of a given resource 
enhancement project may be borne by the present gen-
eration, but because natural stocks take time to regener-
ate, the benefits may not be realized until well into 
the future. Since a given dollar value realized in the 
future is worth less than a dollar in the present, future 
costs and benefits must be converted into present value 
terms in order to make a meaningful comparison.11 The 
mathematical process of calculating the present value of 
future costs and benefits is called discounting, and relies 
on an assumption about the opportunity cost of funds, 
known as the discount rate.12 Specifically, using a higher 
discount rate decreases the present value of future dol-
lars relative to current dollars. A “zero” discount rate 
suggests that a dollar in the future is worth a dollar 
today. Given that the choice of discount rate can signifi-
cantly influence the discounted present value of the 
costs and benefits of a policy change, it is a controver-
sial topic (Mikesell 1977, Kahn 1998:111-113). While it 
seems there is no 1 right discount rate, there are certain 
situations that suggest the use of a rate similar to the 
risk-free market rate of interest, such as that earned 
on long-term U.S. Treasury bonds, and other situations 
where it makes intuitive sense to use a discount rate 
lower than the risk-free market rate.
Finally, it is important to acknowledge the poten-
tial uncertainty surrounding the outcomes of particular 
policies and thus the difficulties of choosing 1 policy 
over another using BCA. Because there is likely some 
uncertainty in the parameter estimation of in any cause-
and-effect relationships involving wildlife, it is useful 
if not necessary to perform some type of sensitivity 
analysis. For example, consider a policy designed to 
reduce the growth of urban deer populations through 
the implementation of controlled public hunts or birth 
control. In either case, natural parameters such as deer 
population size, fecundity and mortality rates will be 
unknown but will have an important bearing on the 
efficacy of the policy change in accomplishing its objec-
tives. It is therefore critical that the assumed parameters 
in the study are varied over a reasonable range of values 
to examine how sensitive the study’s results are to 
changes in the assumptions. At a minimum, upper and 
10 Distribution of costs and benefits across different types of individuals pres-
ents a similar, and perhaps more complicated issue, as monetary costs 
incurred by 1 party must in some way be compared to monetary benefits 
accruing to another. Such equity considerations of wildlife policy changes, 
while typically not the focus of economic analysis, indeed warrant attention, 
as these matters are likely to be controversial. 
11 For example, for a 5% discount rate, US$100 today is valued at US$105 in 
1 year.
12 The present value, PV, of a dollar value, v, realized t years in the future is 
calculated as: PV = v , where r is the discount rate. 
9 One of the first empirical applications linking wildlife stocks and consumer 
surplus in a dynamic setting was Brown and Hammack’s (1974) study on 
managing waterfowl. Other studies that use a dynamic approach include 
Keith and Lyon (1985), Cooper (1993), and Schuhmann and Easley (2000).
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13 Price will only represent the actual market benefits and market costs for 
the marginal consumer and producer. For the inframarginal consumers and 
producers, prices underestimate benefits and overestimate costs.
lower bounds on the results should be presented (Kahn 
1998).
Empirical Estimation of the Benefits and Costs
For most goods and services, a starting point for 
estimating costs and benefits is the market price that 
facilitates a transaction. The price paid by consumers is 
at least a lower bound on the benefits derived by the 
consumer and an upper bound on the costs of produc-
tion borne by the producer.13 Yet when it comes to 
environmental and natural resources such as wildlife, 
the market price captures only the market value of the 
resource. For many wildlife resources, the nonmarket 
value may likely comprise a larger share, if not all, of 
the total value of a resource to society than the market 
value. This, of course, presents a challenging problem in 
measuring the value of the resources in our BCA objec-
tives or even in “pricing” the resources appropriately so 
that they are not overused and exploited inefficiently. 
Indeed, since price is a rationing device that allocates 
resources to their highest valued use, those resources 
that are not priced or under-priced are likely to be inef-
ficiently allocated, consumed, and/or produced.
The remaining part of this section will discuss 
a number of techniques environmental and natural 
resource economists use to quantify the value society 
places on these resources. The 2 general categories 
include revealed preference methods and stated pref-
erence methods. Before we discuss these methods of 
valuing environmental resources, we briefly discuss the 
2 types of values that comprise the full value of a 
resource, use and nonuse values (Fig. 2). The section 
concludes with a discussion of empirical cost estima-
tion.
Use and Nonuse Values
When considering the benefits derived from wild-
life and other environmental goods and services, it is 
important to recognize that the value of a particular 
resource at any point in time can consist of both a 
use value and a nonuse value. Use value, as suggested 
in Boyle and Bishop (1987), can be divided into both 
consumptive use and nonconsumptive use, the common 
denominator being direct contact with the resource. 
Consumptive use would entail such uses as bagging a 
deer, catching a fish, or trapping a raccoon. Essentially, 
consumptive use means extracting the resource from its 
habitat (Boyle and Bishop 1987). Nonconsumptive use, 
alternatively, relates to the uses of resources that do not 
involve extraction. Bird watching and photographing 
wildlife, for instance, are considered nonconsumptive 
uses. 
Nonuse values, alternatively, account for the 
intangible uses of a resource and represent what be 
referred to as the intrinsic value of the resource. 
Nonuse values themselves capture differ concepts of 
value. Initially, nonuse values were categorized as either 
an option value, which was introduced by Weisbrod 
(1964), or existence value, which was introduced by 
Krutilla (1967). Option value is the value people place 
on the future availability of a resource even though 
there is uncertainty surrounding its future use. Exis-
tence value is the value an individual places on a 
resource simply for its’ preservation. As Brookshire et 
al. (1983) suggest, “Some individuals may derive satisfac-
tion from knowing that a certain species and natural 
environments exist and therefore may be willing to 
pay for the preservation of such natural resources.” For 
specificity’s sake, 2 additional categories were defined 
since Weisbrod’s (1964) and Krutilla’s (1967) original 
classification, including bequest value and altruistic 
value. Bequest value captures the nonuse value for the 
resource today so that future generations will have the 
opportunity to use it, while altruistic value captures 
the nonuse value for a resource today by an individual 
so that others have an opportunity to use it today. It 
should be emphasized that while most environmental 
economists agree that resources can have both exis-
tence and option values, there is some disagreement 
about whether our valuation methodologies can mea-
sure these values accurately (Brookshire et al. 1983, 
Boyle and Bishop 1987, Brookshire and Smith 1987, 
Madariaga and McConnell 1987).14 
Revealed Preference Methods
Revealed preference methods examine decisions 
that individuals make regarding market goods that are 
used together with nonmarket goods to reveal the value 
of the nonmarket good (Kahn 1998). These methods 
require that a link be established between changes in 
the environmental good or resource and changes in the 
observed behavior of people. For instance, decreases 
in water quality along a particular stretch of river may 
result in fewer fish. Anglers, whose objectives are to 
catch fish, may move to another part of the river or to a 
different river altogether. Thus, a link can be established 
between the environmental resource, in this case water 
quality (or fish), and observed behavior – angler fishing 
location. In establishing this link, it is important to 
account for any other potential factors that may be caus-
ing behavior to change and, as mentioned in Bockstael 
and McConnell (1999), requires that we observe “paired 
observations” between different levels of the environ-
mental good and the associated levels of observed 
14 These values are also referred to as “passive use” values. That people readily 
contribute to wildlife or other environmental organizations is often cited 
as evidence that these values exist. However, the topic of nonuse values in 
economics is not without controversy. Again, see the above references for a 
more complete discussion.
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behavior. With this information, we can estimate a func-
tion, such as a demand or marginal willingness to pay 
function, which will allow us to estimate the value of 
particular changes in an environmental resource. The 
4 most commonly used revealed preference methods 
we will discuss are the travel cost method (TCM), the 
random utility model approach, the hedonic travel cost 
method (HM), and the household production function 
(Bockstael et al. 1987, 1989).
The TCM, 1 of the most widely used valuation 
techniques, uses information on the travel costs and 
number of trips to a particular site to estimate the value 
of that site or the value of resources that comprise the 
site. As Mendelsohn and Brown note, the TCM uses the 
fact that people travel different distances to a particular 
site and therefore can be expected to participate at 
different levels. Using the distance traveled as a proxy 
for the price of a trip and the number of trips as the 
quantity, individual or group demand curves can be 
estimated for a site.15 The net benefits of a particular 
site or the value of the resources within each site can 
then be estimated. That is, with data on the number of 
visits a group of hunters, anglers, or recreationists take 
in a given period of time, a measure of the quality of 
the resource realized on each trip,16 and the travel costs 
incurred, we can estimate a demand or marginal benefit 
function for trips. This function can then be used to 
calculate the change in benefits from a change in the 
resource quality measure. 
There are a number of wildlife valuation studies 
that use TCM. One of the first TCM studies valuing wild-
life was by Miller and Hay (1981), who estimated the 
degree to which hunting site characteristics and travel 
distances affect hunter participation and calculated the 
annual losses to duck hunters from a 10% loss of habitat 
at waterfowl hunting sites. Sandry et al. (1983) used the 
TCM to evaluate Rocky Mountain elk tag pricing strate-
gies in Oregon. They found that increases in the current 
price for elk hunting tags would increase revenues to 
the Department of Fish and Wildlife and would more 
closely equilibrate the demand for elk hunting permits 
with the departments exogenously determined supply. 
Brooks (1988), in using the TCM to estimate the net 
economic value for deer hunting in Montana, found that 
hunters would be willing to pay an additional US$108 
more per trip, on average, than they currently pay.17
The Random Utility Model is a variation of the 
travel cost method where the choice of recreation site is 
viewed as a function of the satisfaction, or utility hereaf-
ter, derived from the alternative sites. A trip utility func-
tion is specified to be a function of site characteristics 
and can be estimated using data on individual trips and 
site characteristics. The estimated utility function can 
then be used to approximate the consumer surplus 
from a change in 1 of the site characteristics. For recre-
ational hunting trips, a characteristic likely to influence 
site choice is the expected success rate.18 This tech-
nique can therefore be employed to value hypothetical 
changes in hunting success rates. While there are many 
applications and studies using RUMs, including valuing 
changes in water quality and characteristics associated 
with fishing (e.g., Bockstael et al.1987, Morey et al. 1991, 
Kaoru et al. 1995, and Schuhmann 1998), analyses of 
other wildlife-related resources are sparse.19
The hedonic travel cost method is used to 
measure the value of separate characteristics of a 
resource (Brown and Mendelsohn 1983, Mendelsohn 
1984, Palmquist 1991). In essence, by observing pur-
chases of market goods – travel, in this case – which 
must be made to gain access to the resource, one can 
impute the implicit prices for characteristics of the 
resource. This method relies on differences in the travel 
costs and expenditures across agents in their gaining 
access to the resource to value the associated envi-
ronmental amenities. For example, using data collected 
on the travel costs across individuals to various sites 
they visit, as well as the physical and environmental 
attributes of each particular site, we can estimate a 
function describing how travel costs (i.e., price) are 
related to those attributes. From here, the contribution 
of the environmental good to the “price” of travel can 
be approximated. Furthermore, the value of a change in 
the environmental good can be estimated. 
Traditionally, hedonic models have been used to 
value characteristics of market goods but there are 
numerous applications to natural resources. Brown and 
Mendelsohn (1983) used a hedonic travel cost model to 
estimate the value of congestion, scenery, and fish den-
sity to Washington steelhead anglers. Livengood (1983), 
in his analysis of white-tailed deer hunting in Texas, 
used a hedonic travel cost model to value the deer 
harvested on leased land. Deer were again the focus of 
Mendelsohn’s (1984) study that used the hedonic travel 
cost method to value increases in deer density in Penn-
sylvania. Finally, Englin and Mendelsohn (1985) used the 
hedonic travel cost method to estimate the impact of 
forestry on recreation in the Cascade Mountains.
The household production function (HPF) 
approach estimates wildlife values by linking changes 
15 It should be emphasized the TCM is generally used to estimate the demand at 
1 particular site and not a number of sites.
16 For example, the number of fish caught on a fishing trip or a measure of the 
quality of game hunted.
17 Also targeting deer hunting, Balkan and Kahn (1988) estimated the value of 
increasing deer populations in New York. Finally, Adamowicz et al. (1990) 
developed a variant of the traditional TCM, essentially a sequential TCM, to 
value sites that allow big horn sheep hunting in Alberta.
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in benefits from a decrease in hunting quality can also be estimated with 
this method.
19 Schwabe et al. (2000) used a RUM to estimate the value of increasing 
deer season length as a means of increasing hunter welfare and decreas-
ing the impacts of deer populations on crop damage and deer-vehicle 
collisions.
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in observable household outputs to changes in environ-
mental resources. In effect, we assume that the house-
hold, in its efforts to maximize utility with a limited 
budget of time and money, produces outputs such as 
recreation time, expenditures on certain wildlife-related 
goods, number of trips to engage in a specific type 
of resource-related activity, harvested deer, and other 
goods. The relationship we have to establish, then, is 
between changes in the resource in question and 1 or 
more of the outputs that go into the household produc-
tion function. This method, unfortunately, is subject 
to a number of difficulties in the estimation process 
thus limiting its use in evaluating wildlife resources 
(Pollack and Wachter 1975, Bockstael and McConnell 
1981, Brown and Mendelsohn 1983). Empirical applica-
tions of this method include Keith and Lyon (1985) who 
estimated the value to hunters of an increase in a Utah 
deer herd. 
Stated Preference Methods
Stated preference methods employ survey tech-
niques to solicit value measures directly from individ-
uals by asking hypothetical questions. That is, rather 
than drawing inferences about value from observed 
behavior, stated preference methods ask people about 
the values they place on nonmarket goods such as wild-
life resources. Obviously, the principal advantage of 
revealed preference methods is that they use actual 
market behavior as a starting point for the estimation 
of resource values. However, this also means that 
these methods are insufficient to capture the value of 
resources that are not associated with direct use. Stated 
preference techniques, which rely on the use of sur-
veys, are the only methods able to capture the nonuse 
values associated with a resource. Two of the more 
popular stated preference techniques are the contingent 
valuation method and conjoint analysis.
The contingent valuation method (CVM) is the 
most commonly employed of the stated preference tech-
niques for valuing environmental and natural resources. 
It has been used to value wildlife resources for both 
consumptive and nonconsumptive purposes, including 
wildlife such as bald eagles and striped shiners (Boyle 
and Bishop 1987), grizzly bears and bighorn sheep 
(Brookshire et al. 1983), deer (Loomis et al. 1989a), 
and waterfowl (Brown and Hammack 1973, Bishop and 
Heberlein 1979). Survey respondents are presented with 
detailed descriptions of resource quality and are asked 
to either directly state their willingness to pay for hypo-
thetical changes in that quality or to indicate whether 
or not they would be willing to pay a specific value. 
While the contingent valuation method is the subject of 
a great deal of controversy,20 it also holds great promise 
for the study of nonmarket values. In 1990, as a result 
of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, the National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Association (NOAA) drafted the Oil 
Pollution Act, which specifically advocated the use of 
the contingent valuation method for measuring nonuse 
values associated with damages to natural resources. 
Within the environmental and natural resource 
valuation literature, conjoint analysis (CA) is the less 
used stated preference technique to date. Essentially, it 
differs from CVM in that conjoint analysis asks people to 
make hypothetical choices across pair-wise bundles of 
goods or by having people rank a number of alternatives 
with a “price” being 1 alternative or characteristic in 
the bundle. While this technique is just starting to gain 
momentum in the environmental and natural resource 
valuation literature (e.g., Louviere 1988, Adamowicz et 
al. 1999), it has been widely used by researchers in 
other disciplines (e.g., transportation, marketing, and 
psychology) and for other problems.
The above discussion provided a brief description 
of some of the most widely used environmental 
resource valuation techniques and some examples of 
how they have been used. Some of these methods are 
accepted by federal and state agencies. For example, 
the National Marine Fisheries Service has designated 
random utility models as its chosen valuation technique. 
CVM and TCM have been supported and used by the 
U.S. Water Resources Council, and by state fish and 
game agencies in such states as Oregon, Nevada, Cali-
fornia, Idaho, and Maine (Loomis 1993). While these 
methods are widely used, it is important to stress that 
none of the approaches mentioned is without its flaws. 
Indeed, there is continual debate on the validity and 
tractability of each method discussed above. 
Valuing a Deer – A Comparison Across 
Applications
A valid question at this point is, how would these 
different techniques compare in the values they assign a 
particular resource? Indeed, given there are a multitude 
of assumptions associated with each 1 of these methods 
that may likely influence the actual outcome, and given 
the often tentative links that are made between changes 
in the environmental or wildlife resource and how 
people respond or suggest they would respond, we 
would not expect the values to be equal across meth-
ods. Yet, we would hope that the values would not 
be an order of magnitude off without a good reason. 
One resource that has been estimated using 3 different 
techniques is the value of an additional deer. Estimates 
of the value of an additional deer from outside the envi-
ronmental and natural resource economics literature 
have ranged from US$965 (Reed et al. 1982) to US$1,468 
(Romin and Bissonette 1996b) in 1996 dollars. Reed et 
al. (1982) based their estimates on a value determined 
in a district court case in Golden, Colorado, whereas 
20 Much of the controversy centers on the various types of biases that may 
result when individuals are asked to state true values for hypothetical 
changes in resource quality. See Kahn (1998:102-109) for details on these 
biases.
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Roman and Bissonette (1996a) used estimates of total 
hunting expenditures on licenses and permits in Utah. 
Within the environmental and natural resource 
literature, we can compare the results put forth by Keith 
and Lyon (1985), Loomis et al. (1989a), and Schwabe 
et al. (2000). As mentioned above, Keith and Lyon 
(1985) use a household production function approach 
to estimate the value to recreational hunters of a 1-unit 
increase in mule deer herd size. They combine an esti-
mate of the value of increasing hunter success with an 
estimate of the responsiveness of hunter success to an 
increase in deer herd resulting in an estimate for the 
value of an additional deer of US$64.26 in 1996 dollars. 
Loomis et al. (1989a) used a contingent valuation 
survey to estimate the willingness to pay for an addi-
tional deer while considering both consumptive use 
(i.e., the chance to bag an additional deer) and noncon-
sumptive use (i.e., the chance to view a deer). They sur-
veyed California households and deer hunters to obtain 
willingness to pay estimates for deer. Their results sug-
gested that the consumptive value of an average buck 
was approximately of US$165, and the nonconsumptive 
value of an average deer was US$15.50. In 1996 dollars 
these amount to US$208.78 and US$19.61, respectively.
Finally, Schwabe et al. (2000) used a random util-
ity modeling method and estimated the value of a deer 
at approximately US$182 in 1996 dollars. This value 
estimate represents what Loomis et al. (1989a) termed 
the consumptive value. These results are surprisingly 
similar across studies in that they are less than an order 
of magnitude different.
Costs
Of course, there are a variety of costs associated 
with wildlife resources. There are direct costs the wild-
life resources impose on humans, opportunity costs 
associated with their habitat, external costs they impose 
on other wildlife resources that humans value, and 
finally the costs associated with maintaining a particu-
lar resource level or population. To perform a proper 
BCA, all of these costs should be acknowledged and bal-
anced against the benefits of maintaining the resource 
over time. The example of maintaining a particular deer 
population provides a more illustrative description of 
each of these costs. 
The direct costs deer impose on humans have 
been widely discussed and enumerated. One of the 
direct costs of maintaining a particular deer population 
is the impact of deer-vehicle collisions on human life, 
morbidity, and property damage. These costs are typi-
cally estimated by using medical and/or insurance costs, 
or value of life statistics. For instance, Reed et al. (1982) 
surveyed vehicle repair costs from Colorado State Patrol 
accident reports and benchmarked those costs against 
accident values as reported in insurance claims. Hansen 
(1983) surveyed drivers that had submitted accident 
reports to the Michigan State Police and obtained values 
associated with property damage, injury and/or death. 
Conover et al. (1995) surveyed the literature to come up 
with an average vehicle repair bill. With the exception 
of Hansen (1983), though, costs associated with human 
injury and fatalities were neglected. 
Crop damage is another major direct cost 
imposed on humans by deer. Typically, the costs of 
agricultural damages from deer can be estimated as the 
market value of the lost commodity, and/or the cost 
of implementing preventative measures. For example, 
McNew and Curtis (1997) reported the extent of deer 
damage to select grain crops in Maryland by multiplying 
farmer-reported acreage losses by grain prices at harvest 
time. Furthermore, these authors used regression analy-
sis of farmer-reported estimates of damages and on-site 
deer populations to calculate a deer population elastic-
ity of crop damage. This elasticity measure allows for 
the estimation of the additional damages that would 
likely be incurred from a given increase in the deer 
population.21 In addition to crop damage and vehicle 
accidents, wildlife also impose direct costs through the 
transmission of diseases (e.g., lyme disease), wildlife 
attacks, and damages to households and the timber 
industry (Conover et al. 1995). 
In addition to direct costs, opportunity costs asso-
ciated with wildlife habitat (the foregone value that 
their habitat could garner) should be considered. That 
is, any wildlife resource requires a habitat that could, in 
most cases, be put to use in other activities. Wenders 
(1995) asserted that landowners, whether public or pri-
vate, often receive little compensation or generate little 
revenue by providing or maintaining an adequate habi-
tat for elk. As such, he suggested that competing inter-
ests for the use of the land, particularly by timber 
or grazing interests, lead to a less-than-optimal supply 
of habitat for elk from a social perspective. Similarly, 
Brower and Slangen (1998) discussed how the variety 
rich vegetation alongside banks and ditches alongside 
peat meadowland provide excellent habitat for many 
plant and bird species. Yet, much of this habitat is losing 
ground to agricultural interests. Indeed, in this instance 
the opportunity cost of maintaining the habitat is the 
foregone income that could be generated by cropping 
it. 
Another type of cost is the cost wildlife resources 
impose on other wildlife resources. While these costs 
are somewhat more complicated to calculate since they 
often require “costing” other nonmarket goods, they 
can have real impacts on valued resources. For instance, 
in maintaining a certain density of deer per square 
mile, potential indirect costs the deer impose on other 
21 For example, they estimate that a 10 % increase in the Maryland deer popula-
tion would likely cause US$1.15 million in additional losses in revenues from 
corn, soybeans and wheat. 
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wildlife resources include loss of habitat for herb and 
seedling species, or loss of the songbird species habitat 
(Guynn 1999). Coyotes, by preying on sheep, may 
impose additional costs on humans via less wool. Unless 
these “other resources” have particular market-based 
values, imputing a cost from their potential decline 
would require some type of valuation study described 
above. 
A final type of cost is the cost of interventions 
to maintain wildlife populations. As mentioned previ-
ously, the USDA Animal Damage Control Program spent 
over US$26 million in 1988 alone on efforts to control 
damages from wildlife, while the administrative costs 
reached US$11 million. In addition to administrative 
costs, there are often costs associated with installing 
and maintaining structures intended to either maintain 
existing wildlife populations or reduce the damage 
wildlife population impose on society. For example, 
efforts to reduce deer-vehicle collisions have included 
the use of a variety of technologies, including deer whis-
tles on cars, deer signs, fences, underpasses and over-
passes, and reflectors (Romin and Bissonette 1996b). 
With the exception of administrative costs, estimating 
the costs of installation and maintenance is relatively 
straightforward. For operating and maintenance costs, 
the market price on materials and labor provides a good 
estimate of their annual costs. For installation costs, 
again, the market prices on materials and labor (dis-
counted over the life expectancy of the project) provide 
a suitable annual cost estimate. 
Thus, in estimating the costs of maintaining wild-
life resources or populations, market prices often pro-
vide a good starting point. Indeed, in calculating the 
costs associated with human and property damage, the 
land foregone for habitat, and mitigating or maintenance 
factors market prices provide a suitable approach. Yet, 
for the external costs on the environment and other 
wildlife resources, as well as for the enumeration of the 
associated administrative costs, other means will likely 
be necessary.
POLICY IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
Once the estimated optimal population size is 
found, the question of how to achieve that level arises. 
Or, if the current level and optimal level are the same, 
how can such a population size be maintained? Two 
general approaches to regulating wildlife that may be 
used to achieve population objectives include open-
access regulations and limited-entry regulations (Kahn 
1998). Open-access regulations are those regulations 
that modify user behavior yet not user participation 
directly. Limited-entry techniques try to encourage the 
desired behavioral outcome through the use of eco-
nomic incentives.
Open-Access Regulations
Open-access regulations, similar to what are gen-
erally termed “command and control” style strategies, 
call for the direct regulation of the users of the wildlife 
resource through rules or standards. As such, they man-
date restrictions as to how, when, or where users can 
utilize the resource. For example, open-access regula-
tions in hunting would include restrictions on the type 
of guns allowed, allowable hunting days per week or 
weeks within the year, or limits on the number of 
bucks or does a hunter can bag. These regulations are 
designed to maintain the wildlife resource population 
at a desired level, but because they do not directly 
target who participates, they do not necessarily serve 
to ration or allocate the resource toward the users who 
value it the highest. The restrictions imposed by open-
access regulations increase the costs to the users of 
the resource. Hence, indirectly, open-access regulations 
can lead to relatively less participation by less efficient 
users of the resource if the added costs to the individual 
hunter of complying with the regulations exceed the 
value generated to the individual from hunting. For 
example, restricting allowable hunting days to Mondays 
through Saturdays imposes added time constraints on 
users relative to allowing hunters the option of hunting 
Monday through Sundays. Similarly, limiting the allow-
able weapons to shotguns rather than rifles limits the 
range at which hunters can bag deer, and again imposes 
an additional cost.
Interestingly, while restrictions on use can 
impose additional costs directly on the users of the 
resource, the intent of these restrictions is often to 
limit the costs that individual users indirectly impose on 
other users and nonusers. For instance, as Lueck (1995) 
pointed out, some hunters can impose harmful effects 
on others by using certain weapons that increase the 
probability of an injury to a nonuser (dynamite, high-
powered rifles, etc), or by hunting in areas of high 
incidence of non-hunting human presence (roadsides, 
urban areas, etc.). As such, open-access regulations can 
directly address these potential problems.
Yet, it should be noted that while open-access 
regulations can indeed minimize the impact of user 
behavior on others, users are still likely to impose costs 
on each other given that access to the resource is still 
open to all who are willing to overcome the additional 
constraints. Since the regulation does not directly ration 
participation rates, the resource is open to uncontrolled 
access whereby decisions by individual users of the 
resource rarely consider the impact of their actions on 
other users. 
Limited-Entry Regulations 
Alternatively, limited entry regulations, similar to 
incentive-based instruments, are a flexible approach 
that also target optimal population levels but do so by 
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encouraging private interests to coincide with social 
interests. This works in 1 of 2 ways. The regulation may 
include either a tax or a fee to limit participation (e.g., a 
fee for the right to fish or hunt in a given area). Or, this 
regulation can require a system of permits or licenses 
that give the owner the right to use the resource. Prefer-
ably, the permits are salable or transferable and thus can 
be reallocated to the users that value the resource the 
most.
Evaluating Open-Access and Limited-Entry 
Regulations
In deciding upon the economic merits of a 
particular strategy within these 2 general alternative 
approaches, 3 criteria emerge. First, does the strategy 
allocate the resources to the users who value it the 
most? Second, are the users utilizing the resource in 
the most cost-effective manner? And third, are the full 
costs of using the resource borne by those users who 
are realizing the benefits from its use? 
The incentive-based systems of transferable per-
mits and fees do tend to allocate the resource to those 
who value it more, as those who are not willing to pay 
the fee or buy the permit will not have access. Even if 
the fee is initially set too low, it still has the effect of 
excluding users whose value of using the resource is 
lower than the fee. In the case of transferable or market-
able permits, we are likely to observe a flow of permits 
towards users who value the resource more (buyers of 
permits) and away from users who value the resource 
less (sellers of permits). Another advantage of tax or 
permit systems is that they minimize the costs to users 
in engaging in the activity. That is, users have the flex-
ibility to choose the least costly manner in which to 
use the resource. Yet, and this is necessarily a problem 
with this sort of regulation, users may still impose exter-
nal costs on others depending on the methods they 
choose to utilize the resource. So, while the regulations 
minimize the costs to the users, they may impose undue 
external costs on other users or on society in general. 
In principle, then, both types of policies could 
achieve the desired objective of reducing damage to 
the stock and therefore promote growth. However, the 
limited-entry strategy is likely to meet the objective at 
lower cost since open-access strategies treat all users 
of the resource the same, regardless of how much it 
costs them individually to comply with the standard.22 
We therefore see that the limited-entry regulations meet 
the requirements of the first 2 criteria – allocating the 
resource to the highest valued users and minimizing the 
costs of using the resource to the user, whereas open-
access regulations do not. However, with its ability to 
target specific harmful actions, open-access strategies 
may be more effective at reducing some of the potential 
external costs that users may impose on others. It would 
seem, then, that the optimal strategy would include 
components of both types of regulation. The limited-
entry component serves to limit the users to those that 
value the resource the most while the open-access regu-
lations would minimize some of the negative effects 
that users impose on others. Indeed, this combination 
strategy is what we often observe in practice. 
Finally, our discussion has not fully addressed 
the issue of public versus private land ownership. This 
distinction is extremely important for the optimal man-
agement of wildlife resources, including both optimal 
population size and efficient regulatory strategy. For 
a complete discussion of the public/private land use 
dimensions and their impact on policy, see Loomis 
(1993) and Lueck (1995).
CONCLUSION
 There is little uncertainty that wildlife-human 
conflicts impose significant costs on society. Yet, as 
most wildlife managers, hunters, and nature enthusiasts 
would agree, there is also enormous value associated 
with these same wildlife resources. In this review, we 
have attempted to provide a framework to help deci-
sion-makers manage these wildlife resources more effi-
ciently. In essence, we have illustrated the potential 
use of benefit-cost analysis to improve the efficiency of 
wildlife resource management. Optimal wildlife popula-
tions can be estimated through a careful balancing of 
the benefits and costs of wildlife to society, both now 
and in the future. 
In particular, we described a number of methods 
for placing a value on certain types of wildlife 
resources. These methods, including the revealed pref-
erence and stated preference techniques, can help to 
quantify the value of these resources to society, particu-
larly those values which might not be assessed when 
using the traditional market-based pricing approach. 
Indeed, the nonmarket values from many of the wildlife 
resources may likely overshadow their market-based 
values. Furthermore, we introduced a variety of cost 
categories to describe the wide range of opportunity 
costs associated with maintaining wildlife populations, 
including (1) harmful wildlife-human interactions, (2) 
impacts on other wildlife resources, (3) foregone pro-
duction or value of their habitats in other uses, and (4) 
the direct regulatory and mitigating costs of control. 
We showed that a stand-alone market-based approach 
to wildlife resource management will fail to balance 
the full range of costs and benefits from maintaining 
wildlife resources. Rather, these types of resources are 
better managed, with optimality in mind, by using a 
22 For economic efficiency, that is, to achieve the desired result at lowest pos-
sible cost, and given that users are likely to differ with respect to ability and 
effort, the cost-effective strategy allows the user the freedom to choose the 
most efficient means of using the resource.
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combination of regulatory strategies that both maximize 
the value of the resource to the actual users while 
minimizing the private and social costs to other users 
and nonusers.
Finally, in reviewing the literature, 2 strands seem 
to have evolved. There is the literature associated with 
valuing wildlife resources, and includes the work by 
Hammack and Brown (1974), Loomis et al. (1989b), 
Keith and Lyon (1985), and Mendelsohn (1984). There is 
also the literature on the costs of wildlife management 
and efforts to reduce harmful human-wildlife interac-
tions, including the work by Conover et al. (1995), 
Roman and Bissonette (1996a,b), and Reed et al. 
(1982). In essence, there is increasingly more literature 
and research on both the benefits associated with wild-
life resources and the costs associated with wildlife 
resources. What seems to be lacking, then, is a merging 
of these 2 strands into useful and informative exercises 
investigating optimal wildlife management strategies. 
With due acknowledgement of the problems associated 
with estimating both the values derived from wildlife 
resources and the costs that are associated with 
their maintenance, the principle elements required for 
proper benefit-cost analyses do exist.
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